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CHINA’S MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR
THE UK EXPERIENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
THE WEST
MIWA HIRONO AND MANSHU XU
Although political friction and ideological differences between China and the West can
hamper co-operation on missions known as ‘Military Operations Other than War’, the UK
and China have achieved a certain level of success in this regard, particularly in relation
to UN peacekeeping and counter-piracy operations. In this article, Miwa Hirono and
Manshu Xu argue that the key has been to use multilateral platforms to frame bilateral
collaboration, thereby diminishing Chinese perceptions of the associated political risks.
Thus it is useful for Western militaries to exploit multilateralism to make military
co-operation more attractive to China.
C
hina and theWest face a number
of common security challenges
in the twenty-first century.
These include intra-state conflicts in
Africa, terrorist attacks around the
world, large-scale natural disasters and
the (now-diminishing) threat of piracy
in the Gulf of Aden. Meeting these
challenges requires in-depth international
co-operation and co-ordination involving
civilian, military and even paramilitary
resources. Many armed forces, including
those of the US, UK and China, have
engaged in ‘Military Operations other
than War’ (MOOTW) – in other words,
‘the use of military capabilities across
the range of military operations short of
war’, for example, peacekeeping, disaster
relief and counter-piracy operations.
1
In a globalised world, MOOTW are
inherently multilateral. However,
military co-operation between China
and the West is often limited by political
divergence and different ideological
stances on issues of international
security.
Sino–US relations in particular
make such co-operation difficult.
Despite tireless assurances about their
respective peaceful intentions, the
US and China experience continuing
friction over a variety of issues, ranging
from the People’s Liberation Army’s
(PLA) military build-up to currency
exchange rates. In particular, the
United States’ announcement in 2011
of arms sales to Taiwan resulted in the
cancellation of a number of US–China
military exercises.
2
Kurt Campbell and
Richard Weitz argued in 2005 that the
many deep-rooted sources of tension
between the two ‘suggest the need for
modest expectations about near-term
progress both in military ties and broader
relations’.
3
This remains the case today,
even after the Obama administration
emphasised the importance of a ‘deeper
and more effective partnership’ with
China in the US National Security Strategy
published in 2010.
4
In contrast, Sino–UK relations are
not characterised by such friction. There
has, in fact, been a certain level of success
in UK–Chinese military co-operation
on MOOTW, particularly in relation to
UN peacekeeping and counter-piracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden. The key
to this success lies in the fact that their
bilateral co-operation has been framed
using multilateral platforms, helping to
ease the political risk China perceives
to be associated with this collaboration,
including that of revealing its real military
capability to the world. China is willing to
join others in military activity so long as
its co-operation helps to further advance
its national interests and to project an
image of itself as a responsible state.
By focusing on illustrative examples
of relatively successful UK–Chinese
collaboration on MOOTW, this article
explores the implications of such
activities for a wider discussion of how
Sino–Western co-operation can be
expanded. Indeed, the West should
exploit multilateralism to make military
co-operation more attractive to China.
Opportunities and Challenges in
UK–ChineseMilitary Co-operation
Both Chinese and UK defence policies
are conducive to international military
co-operation, suggesting that the two
countries recognise those security
© 2013 The Author(s). Published by Routledge.
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The UK’s then-Foreign Secretary David Miliband during a visit to a peacekeeping-force training centre in Langfang, Heibei Province, China, March 2010.
Courtesy of Feng Li/Getty Images.
challenges requiring a multilateral
military response as matters of national
importance. China’s latest defence White
Paper, published in April 2013, advocates
the establishment of military-to-military
confidence-building mechanisms, and
emphasises the Chinese leadership’s
focus on ‘the new security concepts
featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality and coordination’, and on
international co-operation in the form of
‘UN peacekeeping missions, international
counter-terrorism cooperation,
international merchant shipping
protection and disaster relief operations’.
5
Participation in international
MOOTW also features prominently
in UK foreign- and defence-policy
frameworks. The UK’s most recent
defence White Papers discuss how
to address its security challenges in
a changing international strategic
context.
6
The ongoing transition from
a decade of combat operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan to a post-ISAF
period means that the UK now needs
to consider new forms of international
military engagement and contribution,
for example, through UN peacekeeping.
7
Strengthening mutual trust and
confidence is important to the PLA
and the UK armed forces, particularly
because it would better enable the
latter to understand China’s strategy
and the PLA’s future direction. China’s
defence spending has increased – often
by double-digit percentages – since the
late 1990s.
8
This tends to raise some
concerns among UK officials and scholars
about Chinese intentions regarding
future global politics.
9
The participation
of China’s military forces in international
MOOTW provides an ideal opportunity
for it to ease such concerns and project a
non-threatening image as a ‘responsible
state’.
10
Despite the existing favourable
policy environment, political tensions
hamper deeper co-operation between
the UK and China to an extent. The first of
these relates to fundamental ideological
differences between the two, especially
regarding the way in which they
understand the concept of sovereignty
and their international obligations.
Differences arise on the question of
how far the concept of sovereignty
extends with regards to humanitarian
catastrophe in conflict areas and
whether the international community
should or should not use military force in
conflict areas to protect civilians. China
subscribes to a rigid interpretation of
sovereignty, in which state authority is
understood as ‘the ultimate authority
for dealing with all domestic and foreign
affairs faced by the nation state’.
11
While
some research suggests that China’s
interpretation of sovereignty has become
more flexible in recent years, it remains
extremely cautious about an elastic
interpretation of sovereignty that could
lead to military intervention without
local or state consent.
12
The UK, on the
other hand, has conducted major military
interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Libya since 2001, prioritising other
political and humanitarian considerations
over the principle of sovereignty. This
ideological difference prompted China
to be either unsupportive or very critical
of the use of force in all of the above-
mentioned interventions. Greater military
co-operation between China and the
UK – similar to that which the latter has
developed with the US and EU member
states, for example – has been difficult in
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the face of such fundamental ideological
differences.
The second tension lies in the two
countries’ ambivalent bilateral relations,
particularly due to their potential
effect on their international positions
vis-à-vis other key actors. From the UK
government’s perspective, co-operation
with China cannot be promoted at the
expense of its relationships with other
actors of strategic importance, including
the US, the EU, NATO and India. The UK
needs to address any concerns those
actors might have about closer British
relations with China, making it is essential
that the UK communicates its intentions
clearly and perhaps takes an incremental
approach.
13
From China’s perspective,
too, the kind of co-operation it can have
with the UK is restricted to activities
that do not jeopardise the country’s
‘independent’ foreign policy. Under no
circumstances would China work under
the command and control of other states,
meaning that its UN peacekeeping and
counter-piracy operations must be
conducted under a UN mandate. This is
one of the reasons why it was difficult for
China to agree to the implementation of
an integrated transit corridor, formed by
the warships of different contributing
nations, to counter piracy in the Indian
Ocean, for example.
The third tension is related to
a widespread view among Western
analysts that the Chinese military is not
interested in deepening international
military co-operation.
14
A number of UK
policy-makers suggested that it is difficult
to negotiate such programmes with
China because there is often a long wait
for a response, reportedly due in part
to its complex, bureaucratic decision-
making system.
15
More importantly,
this may well be the result of the PLA’s
reluctance to reveal any gaps in military
capability.
16
From the point of view of
the PLA, however, the perceived risk in
discussing its capabilities in detail no
longer prevents it from participating in
international military missions, to which
it has an increasingly open and positive
attitude.
17
These tensions will be difficult
to resolve in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, although it is important to
recognise the clear differences between
the two countries, focusing on what
is common to both is likely to be more
fruitful than remaining trapped in a
cul-de-sac of stagnant debate over
fundamental ideological and political
differences, and speculation about
whether China is genuinely interested in
military co-operation. The key is to build
on shared interests.
UK–ChineseMilitary Co-operation
on UN Peacekeeping Operations
UN peacekeeping operations provide
opportunities for the two countries to
co-operate. Indeed, China’s increasing
participation in these operations is rooted
in its desire to maintain regional stability,
an essential element of the country’s
‘going out’ strategy. The People’s Republic
of China (PRC) is also keen to project an
image of responsible statehood
18
– which
the UK has encouraged it to substantiate
through the assumption of greater
international responsibility.
China and the UK have
complementary strengths in
peacekeeping operations. As the largest
contributor of manpower among the five
permanent Security Council members,
19
China has deployed more than 10,000
soldiers and officers from the PLA and
Public Armed Police to more than twenty
missions since 1988. As of October 2013,
the PRC was contributing 1,919 military
and police personnel.
20
Furthermore, a
number of policy-makers and analysts
observe that China tries to offer the
highest possible level of expertise when
contributing to such missions.
21
For
example, the UNUnder-Secretary General
for the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) Hervé Ladsous
commented that ‘Chinese peacekeepers
are very professional, extremely well-
trained and very committed to doing
the job’.
22
These high standards were
also evident in China’s contribution to
peacekeeping in Liberia when one of the
authors visited the country in December
2010, with the quality of the engineering
work undertaken praised by a wide range
of UN staff and local officials.
In contrast, the UK’s level of
contribution to UN peacekeeping during
the last decade has been modest at
best, mainly due to its involvement in
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As of
October 2013, the UK was contributing
284 troops and police officers to UN
peacekeeping operations.
23
However,
the British financial contribution to UN
peacekeeping is the third largest (at 8.15
per cent of the total), after the US and
Japan. China’s contribution is ranked
seventh at 3.93 per cent of the total
for 2013–15.
24
The UK also possesses,
and therefore can contribute, specialist
knowledge regarding peace enforcement
and rapid force deployment, because
of its wide-ranging experience in
interventions within and outside the UN
framework.
Such complementarity has led
China and the UK to work together
on UN peacekeeping operations since
2000. That year, China’s Ministry of
Public Security (MPS) established the
China Peacekeeping CivPol Training
Center (CPCTC) in Langfang, south of
Beijing, and the UK provided the centre
with some technical and equipment
assistance.
25
China’s participation in
the UN Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) created the first opportunity
for direct UK co-operation with the PLA in
the context of peacekeeping operations.
26
While this was not part of a formalised
programme, China and the UK actively
exchanged information before the former
deployed its troops for the first time to
UN operations authorised under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII allows
UN forces to use ‘all necessary means’
or take ‘necessary action’ not only for
self defence, but also in ensuring the
protection of civilians against imminent
physical harm. Understanding the
specific nature of this operation was
therefore essential to China’s successful
deployment.
Indeed, Sino–UK military
co-operation on peacekeeping has
continued intermittently since 2002,
to develop Chinese peacekeepers’
understanding of policy issues and
practical skills.
27
For example, to further
advance its operational standard, China
needed to improve its peacekeepers’
English-language skills. The UK–China
‘peacekeeping English project’, which
ran from 2007 to 2009, was aimed
at senior police officers at the CPCTC
with the purpose of building English-
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language teaching capacity among
Chinese personnel deployed as UN
peacekeepers.
28
A similar project was
implemented from 2009 to 2011 at the
PLA’s Peacekeeping Center in Beijing’s
Huairou District, established in June 2009.
Furthermore, the UK’s Foreign Office
and the Department for International
Development (DfID), the CPCTC, and
Ghana’s Kofi Annan International
Peacekeeping Training Centre undertook
a trilateral police-training project from
2009 to 2011. UK police trainers from
the National Policing Improvement
Agency delivered UN police-development
courses in Beijing and Accra, with the
aim of preparing Chinese and African
peacekeeping police to compete for
senior positions at the DPKO in New York
or in mission fields.
29
UK–Chinese military co-operation
on peacekeeping demonstrates that the
PRC has the capacity and the willingness
to co-operate with theWest. This positive
interaction has comprised a series of
isolated events that has continued since
2000, developing from one-off donations
and informal exchanges of information
to formal training programmes. The
challenges of deploying high-quality
peacekeepers and obtaining senior
positions at the DPKO have encouraged
China to work more with the UK. It is
worth noting, however, that this has
been politically costly for China. The PLA
and MPS are particularly fearful about
revealing to the world the limitations
of China’s capabilities. Initiating a new
co-operation programme in response
to evolving global security challenges
is therefore more stressful for Chinese
policy-makers than might be imagined.
30
With China emerging from a long history
of international isolation, individual
senior PLA or police officers, fearful of
committing a political error, need to
exercise caution and prudence when
taking up new ideas for collaboration.
31
Such caution notwithstanding,
the need to learn about new security
and operational environments derives
from the changing nature of China’s
responsibilities in multilateral operations
on the ground. This includes moving from
simply ‘mimicking’ other peacekeepers in
so-called traditional peacekeeping activity
authorised under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter, to having to deal with imminent
security threats from local militias and
improving operational standards in
non-traditional peacekeeping authorised
under Chapter VII.
32
The key to China’s
policy shift towards co-operation with
the UK therefore lies in the need to
improve the quality of its operations
and information, which derives from
China’s strategy of increased multilateral
engagement.
UK–ChineseMilitary Co-operation
on Counter-Piracy Operations
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden constitutes
another security threat affecting both
China and the UK. Maintaining the
safety of vessels in this region is of
vital importance to the two countries’
trade: 8 per cent of China’s crude-oil
and liquefied-natural-gas imports come
through the Gulf of Aden,
33
while 15 per
cent of the UK’s natural-gas imports is
also transported through this region.
34
In what was the People’s Liberation
Army Navy’s (PLAN) first operation
outside of Chinese waters, in December
2008 China sent a small fleet of three
ships – two warships and one support
ship with a total crew of over 800 – as
well as two helicopters to the Gulf of
Aden in accordance with UN Security
Council resolutions. The mission was to
protect Chinese ships and crews, as well
as ships carrying humanitarian aid for
international organisations. To date, the
PLAN has sent fifteen such deployments
on rotation (themost recent in November
2013) and has escorted more than 5,200
ships.
35
UK counter-piracy operation
efforts, meanwhile, are multilateral,
forming part of three international
missions: NATO’s Operation Ocean
Shield, the US-led Combined Task Force
151 (CTF-151), and Operation Atalanta,
led by the EU. Together, these missions
protect the length of 480 nautical miles of
the Internationally Recommended Transit
Corridor (IRTC), which shipping vessels
are encouraged to use when crossing the
Gulf of Aden. Therefore, any co-operation
with the UK needs to go through NATO,
the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) or
the EU.
China and the UK have conducted
escort missions separately since the
former began its missions in the region
in 2008. The PLAN’s escort route is 5
nautical miles north of the IRTC, running
parallel to it. Russia, India, Japan and
Malaysia also protect their own escort
routes independently, but China’s task
force is the largest of these ‘independent
deployers’.
36
The reason China maintains
a separate transit corridor from the
EU, NATO and CMF derives from its
‘independent’ foreign policy, which
postulates that the country’s armed
forces should not operate under any
other states’ command and control. This
also explains why China proposed the
concept of the zoned escort mission in
November 2011, dividing responsibility
for small sections of the current IRTC
between the various navies present in the
region.
37
However, this proposal seems to
have faded, as it has been reported that
‘China is not promoting zoned escorts
in SHADE’, the Shared Awareness and
Deconfliction forum.
38
So far, therefore,
the PLAN has not contributed to the IRTC
because there remain questions about
whose leadership it would be expected
to serve under; what process it should
follow in making prompt decisions in an
emergency, such as an attack by pirates
or a hostage situation; and the authority
with which China could command
warships from other countries if it only
holds the chairmanship of the mission in
rotation.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that
they maintain separate transit corridors,
China and the EU, CMF and NATO do
co-operate on counter-piracy operations.
For example, since 2011 Sino–European
collaboration has been essential to
escorting World Food Programme
vessels,
39
with China escorting the vessels
and the EU assisting it in identifying the
recipients of the cargo, to avoid the food
being handed to terrorists.
40
In addition,
China and the UK have co-operated in a
number of international fora to tackle
the issue at the policy level. In January
2009, a contact group was set up by
UN Security Council Resolution 1851
(2008), which brought together nearly
seventy countries, several international
organisations and industry groups with
an interest in combating piracy.
41
The
International Contact Group consists of
four working groups, the first of which
is tasked with promoting operational
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co-ordination between navies,
information sharing and regional capacity
building. Chaired by the UK and including
China among its members,
42
the group
has:
43
agreed on a number of concrete steps
that could be taken to mitigate threats
such as extending the use of industry
Best Management Practices, increasing
the use of military Vessel Protection
Detachments for vulnerable shipping,
increasing the number of military
assets available for the operations, and
possibly increasing land-based options
in the region to support the on-going
counter-piracy operations.
Since March 2009, China has also
participated as an active partner in
SHADE, in which the various militaries
‘deconflict’ their operations or, in other
words, bring assets to the table ‘to
improve co-ordination and minimize
duplication between the various
counter-piracy operations’.
44
SHADE
convenes every three months and is
attended by twenty-seven countries,
including China, India and Japan, regional
organisations such as the EU, NATO and
CMF, law-enforcement agencies and
shipping-industry representatives.
45
According to Captain David Reindorp,
head of the Defence Crisis Management
Centre of the UK Ministry of Defence,
co-ordination through SHADE has been
‘very effective’. He continued: ‘It is
probably the best example of maritime
security co-operation that we have ever
seen’.
46
China’s presence in these fora
represents a significant policy shift.
Sharing information about military
assets is regarded by the PLA as a
highly delicate matter, not just because
this might expose weaknesses in its
force-projection capability, as noted
earlier, but also because it might reveal
too much about the way in which it
operates.
47
However, when co-operation
is based on multilateral platforms such
as the International Contact Group
and SHADE, China is willing to share
information and assets even though
this entails political risk. It is important
to note, however, that China cannot
take too prominent a role in global
security co-operation as yet, because
of the sense of the threat from China
that other powers might feel. This point
was most vividly revealed in the PLAN’s
bid for the SHADE co-chairmanship.
The PLAN had expressed an interest in
leading SHADE since November 2009,
but the proposal did not come to fruition
because of opposition from India at a
SHADE meeting in June 2010.
48
Arguably,
India was wary of an enhanced Chinese
presence in SHADE in particular, and the
Indian Ocean in general.
49
In sum, both China and the UK have
utilised such multilateral frameworks as
the UN, SHADE and the International
Contact Group as the main platforms for
military co-operation on peacekeeping
and counter-piracy. By couching
co-operation in terms of multilateral
frameworks, the UK has exploited China’s
wish to contribute to international
operations at a high standard and has
eased Chinese concerns over the related
political risks of doing so. Multilateral
co-operation not only helps China to
project the image of a responsible
state, but also improves the quality and
quantity of information available to China
about new operational environments
– which is vital to addressing security
challenges in the professional manner
in which the PRC wishes to portray
its work.
50
The use of multilateral
platforms – and thus of institutionalised
co-operation – has also helped individual
Chinese military officers whose military
careers would be at risk should their
co-operation with Western counterparts
be seen as acting on their own initiative.
Implications for the West
The question, then, is what these
examples of UK–Chinese military
co-operation tell us about the future
direction of co-operation with China
with the West more broadly. Austerity
and the need for greater burden-sharing
with rising powers are not particular to
the UK: the same logic also applies to
the US and other European states, which
may well be increasingly compelled to
pursue a strategy of ‘leading from behind’
due to fiscal restraints. Furthermore,
most Western states share the UK’s
fundamental ideological differences and
ambivalent relations with China, and are
similarly faced with the PLA’s apparent
lack of interest in military co-operation.
In seeking greater military co-operation
with China, they must recognise that
the key to success in this regard lies in
devising creative programmes that allow
all sides to avoid, or at least assuage,
political tensions.
The best way to achieve this is
through the exploitation of multilateral
platforms. A top-down bilateral approach
– agreement-in-principle followed by
practical co-operation – will never be
able to bridge the divergent approaches
pursued by China and Western states
in addressing security challenges. What
is needed is a bottom-up multilateral
approach, in the form of creative
co-operation programmes making use
of multilateral channels that narrow
the political divide in the long run.
By using multilateral frameworks to
address common security challenges,
such co-operation programmes help to
build and enhance strategic trust among
practitioners in China and the West. This
will in turn lead to the institutionalisation
of such programmes, potentially serving
as the foundation of even greater
co-operation between China and the
West.
One may question how such a
bottom-up approach could have much
of an impact on the Chinese and the
PLA’s decision-making processes,
when the country is apparently built
on exceptionally hierarchical systems
and cultures. However, this common
perception is slowly changing as China
experiences the pluralisation of its
policy decision-making processes. As
Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox note:
‘Foreigners can no longer solely deal
with one decision maker and must take
into account multiple agencies that have
a stake or say in any given decision’.
51
Today, it has become essential to
deepen policy discussions with a wide
range of Chinese actors, including not
only the Communist Party, government
agencies and the PLA, but also research
organisations and the media.
52
A similar approach to military
co-operation will help China and theWest
to avoid being trapped in unproductive
debate over fundamental ideological
and political differences. For example,
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with US–Chinese military co-operation
diminished following the former’s sale of
arms to Taiwan in 2011, it is clear that
the two countries now need to take a
bottom-up approach to co-operation,
embedded in practical, multilateral
activity rather than symbolic, bilateral
efforts. Focusing on practical objectives
rather than principles would make it
more difficult for tension over Taiwan to
impact upon US–Chinese co-operation.
As a matter of fact, China and the US
already co-operate in this way – through
SHADE, the International Contact Group
and the multilateral AMAN exercises
(initiated and organised by Pakistan) –
despite the US announcement of arms
sales to Taiwan.
53
The two countries also
conducted their first joint counter-piracy
exercise in September 2012, postponed
by the Chinese government the previous
year.
54
Co-operation in counter-piracy
operations can be further strengthened
by, for example, the sharing of scarce
force enablers,
55
such as tankers and
medical ships, between China and NATO
and CMF (given that the US is a leading
actor in these frameworks). Such burden-
sharing is essential not only within these
frameworks but also with other states,
such as China, that are undertaking
independent missions. For instance, the
Chinese naval hospital ship Peace Ark
set sail to the Gulf of Aden on its first
overseas medical mission in September
2011. The ship’s crew provided medical
treatment not only to Chinese soldiers
and officers but also to people in Djibouti,
Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles and
Bangladesh when it called at ports in
these countries.
56
Withmedical assistance
offered on seventeen separate occasions,
in July 2013, to military personnel from
Pakistan, Turkey, the Netherlands and
Saudi Arabia – all of whom were working
for the US-led CTF-151
57
– it would
be worth investigating whether such
services could be extended to NATO and
CMF forces more widely. China is also
considering establishing a counter-piracy
base in the Seychelles, where the US
already has a small drone base for use
in counter-piracy operations.
58
This may
provide greater opportunities for asset
sharing, so long as such co-operation
is undertaken under the auspices of
multilateral frameworks. Moreover,
increasing the number of exchanges
between PLAN and Western officers and
conducting joint escort exercises with
other fleets – not just that of the US –
would not only improve the efficiency of
international counter-piracy operations
but would also build confidence and
trust between international naval forces.
Thus there are many ways in which
working together as part of multilateral
frameworks, for pragmatic rather than
symbolic purposes, would help the US to
strengthen bilateral relations with China,
and build military-to-military confidence.
UN peacekeeping also offers
important opportunities for developing
a bottom-up, multilateral approach to
military co-operation. US and European
armed forces can help the PLA to better
understand what the minimum use
of force means in practice – critical for
those peacekeepers working under a
UN mandate that authorises the use of
‘all necessary means’. Currently, China
tends to contribute force enablers,
such as engineers and medical and
transportation units. However, in January
2012, it dispatched combat forces for the
first time, in the form of a small infantry
platoon to provide force protection
to a larger group of PLA engineers and
medical personnel deployed to South
Sudan.
59
For similar force-protection
purposes, in June 2013 China also stated
that it would dispatch what it calls
‘security forces’ to the UN peacekeeping
operation in Mali.
60
The threat levels in
current African peacekeeping theatres
make it likely that similar force-protection
deployments will be needed in future.
This recent development – the
deployment of Chinese infantry forces –
providesWestern governments and NGOs
with more opportunities to engage with
China by meeting its need to learn about
the different security and operational
environments in which its infantry will
work. Indeed, Chinese peacekeepers have
stated that the PRC needs to develop a
more in-depth understanding of the
consequences of providing infantry to
fulfil such tasks in order to better prepare
for doing so again in the future.
61
Western governments, including
those of the US and UK, as well as think-
tanks and NGOs, have long recommended
that China take a more active role in
peacekeeping by contributing infantry
units. These Western actors can support
China by engaging in a joint study of the
rules of engagement in complex and
dangerous peacekeeping environments,
particularly under the auspices of the
UN. During interviews undertaken
for this article, one question raised
by China’s Peacekeeping Office was
when UN peacekeepers should strike
pre-emptively, for instance, in the face
of imminent threat to civilian lives.
62
A
joint study should take into account the
ongoing dialogue taking place at the
UN Secretariat regarding the emerging
challenges faced by peacekeeping forces
today,
63
including ‘what robust UN
peacekeeping means in practice’.
64
As the
UN’s 2010 ‘New Horizon’ progress report
claims, ‘Lack of shared understanding
among Member States on the scope
and function of robust peacekeeping
has prevented a full examination of its
operational implications for missions,
other partners and local populations’.
65
Co-operation between China and the
West would support the international
dialogue through which shared
understanding can be generated.
Conclusion
This article has examined how the
UK and China have expanded military
co-operation with each other since the
beginning of the 2000s, and explored
the implications of such expansion for
Sino–Westernmilitary co-operation in the
future. Despite political tensions between
China and the West, Sino–Western
military co-operation is made possible
and, indeed, could be expanded through
multilateral frameworks. Multilateralism
provides incentives for China to expand
its co-operation with the West, because
the PRC inevitably needs to improve
its MOOTW-related capabilities and
the quality and quantity of information
available to it about new operational
environments. The experience of
multilateral and institutionalised
co-operation also helps to ease the
perceptions of associated political risk
widely held by many individual Chinese
military officers.
If China can gain from co-operating
with the West, it is also important to
understand what the West can gain in
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return. In terms of sharing best practice
in relation to MOOTW, it is possible
that the Chinese will learn a great
deal without adding much to these
international deployments. Indeed,
while the Chinese are eager to learn from
the West, there is not much discussion
among policy-makers and academics
as to how the West can learn from the
Chinese experience of peacekeeping and
counter-piracy operations.
Nonetheless, the West gains
significant – if possibly indirect and long-
term – benefits from co-operating with
the Chinese. Mutual trust and confidence
between the PLA and its Western
counterparts must be built through
investment in military co-operation
programmes in the years ahead. From
the policy-maker’s perspective, the
establishment of collegial contacts and
such entities as epistemic communities
of Chinese and Western security experts,
focused on military co-operation, could
have a significant impact on the policy-
making process on both sides. The
formation of such communities – that
are engaged ‘in articulating the cause
and effect relationships of complex
problems, helping states identify
their interests, framing the issues for
collective debate, proposing specific
policies, and identifying salient points
for negotiation’
66
– takes time. Thus it
is essential that Western policy-makers
plant the seeds of future epistemic
communities, comprised of Chinese and
Western specialists in MOOTW, as China
rises.
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